Russian-Japanese relations in modern conditions. Russia and Japan: history of relations

Russian-Japanese relations in the 80-90s

Russia's policy towards Japan differed significantly from the course of England and other Western powers. Russia's trade turnover with Japan was insignificant, so Russian capitalists had little interest in maintaining unequal treaties. In 1879, Russian imports and exports amounted to a meager amount - 59.5 thousand yen. The Japanese enjoyed the right to catch and export fish duty-free from Sakhalin; At the mouth of the Amur and other places on the Pacific coast, Japanese fisheries carried out uncontrolled predatory fishing without paying fees. Unlike the Japanese, Russian fish producers had to pay when importing fish to Japan. customs duties, so they could not compete with Japanese businessmen.

Russian exports began to increase rapidly when Russia began importing kerosene to Japan in 1888. The amount of Russian exports rose to 235.5 thousand yen (see). Attempts by the Voluntary Fleet Society in 1889 to obtain permission to purchase coal(10 thousand tons) on the island of Hokkaido in the port of Otarunai were not successful. The Japanese government did not agree to this (see).

Russian ministry Finance and the Ministry of Railways had high hopes for the construction of the Great Siberian Road, believing that building a road to Vladivostok would make Russia a trade intermediary between Europe and the Far East and provide impetus rapid development Russian trade with Japan and China.

In turn, Japanese capitalists were interested in the possibility of using the Siberian road for economic penetration into Eastern Siberia and expansion of trade exchanges with the Russian Far East. According to the Russian embassy, ​​business circles in cities on the western coast of Japan cherished hopes for a significant increase in trade with Russia (see). The leading Japanese newspapers wrote about this in 1893: “Yomiuri”, “Jiyu”, “Hokkaido Shimbun”, “Kokkai”, etc.

In 1895, rice and wheat flour worth 640 thousand yen were exported from Nagasaki to the Primorsky region (see).

As stated above, the tsarist government did not consider it necessary to adhere to a common line with the Western powers on the issue of revising treaties. Russia, subject to its retention of the right of the most favored nation, agreed to make a number of concessions to the Japanese and support the Japanese government over other states.

In 1889, the Russian envoy to Tokyo D.E. Shevich began negotiations on concluding a new Russian-Japanese trade agreement. During the negotiations, the Japanese side agreed to cancel the import duty on salted dried fish with the condition not to include this article in the text of the tariff until other powers renounce the unequal treaties. Unlike Russia, for refusing consular jurisdiction, England and Germany in 1886 demanded that the Japanese publish a new code of civil law before the corresponding agreement was signed. They also insisted on the admission of foreign judges to hear cases involving foreign nationals.

The Russo-Japanese Treaty was signed on August 8 (July 27), 1889. By this time, the United States and Germany had concluded treaties with Japan. Germany also made concessions to Japan, hoping in this way to weaken the position of England and strengthen its political influence in the Far East.

The Russo-Japanese Treaty was to come into force after all the treaty powers renounced the previous unequal treaties. The Russian envoy D.E. Shevich explained to the Japanese side that if Russia unilaterally agreed to the abolition of consular jurisdiction for the mere admission of foreign trade within Japan, then other states, on the basis of the most favored nation principle, could demand admission of their subjects into the country without renouncing consular jurisdiction (see). The Japanese government was satisfied with this clarification. It was ready to compromise and agree to a partial refusal foreign countries from consular jurisdiction. But the intensification of the internal political struggle over the implementation of the reactionary constitution of 1889 and the growing hostility of the people towards foreigners who defended unequal treaties forced the government to hesitate in formalizing such agreements. The ruling elite was afraid of an explosion of popular indignation. Popular discontent with foreigners was sometimes expressed in extreme forms: beatings and murders of foreign missionaries, attempts on the lives of foreign representatives and Japanese government officials who were reputed to be supporters of developing ties with Western powers.

The Japanese press sharply criticized missionary activities, including the Russian spiritual mission in Tokyo. Indeed, English, American and other missionaries, trying to spread Christianity, interfered in the internal affairs of the country, which could not but cause opposition from the Japanese public. The Russian spiritual mission was mainly engaged in educational activities (spreading knowledge about Russia, teaching the Russian language, etc.). However, nationalist-minded people from samurai, student youth and opposition parties in their speeches did not separate representatives of the Russian spiritual mission from Western missionaries countries

In 1890, a crowd threw stones at the Russian envoy D.E. Shevich and his wife, and in 1891, the heir to the royal throne, Nikolai Alexandrovich (the future Tsar Nicholas II), received a saber blow to the head in the city of Otsu from a Japanese policeman named Tsuda. According to the Russian envoy D.E. Shevich, the assassination attempt was not a consequence of general hatred of Russians - it did not exist - but the result of the fact that Tsuda “deeply hates foreigners in general” ( Minister of Internal Affairs Saigo, Minister of Justice Yamada and Minister of Foreign Affairs Aoki, whom D. E. Shevich considered responsible for the incident, were forced to resign at his insistence. Tsuda was sentenced to life in hard labor and died in prison.) .

It must be said that this episode did not have a serious impact on the further development of Russian-Japanese relations.

The basic principles of Russian policy towards Japan were again formulated in the fall of 1892, with the appointment of a new envoy to Tokyo, M.A. Khitrovo.

The instructions to the new envoy noted the stable nature of Russia’s policy in the Far East, which was determined by: “Firstly, the proximity of such relatively strong states as China and Japan; secondly, the insufficient development of our outskirts, distant from the main concentration of our state forces, material and moral, at an enormous distance. Hence the desirability of not only peaceful, but even friendly relations with the above-mentioned states should, on the one hand, ensure the inviolability and tranquility of our own possessions, on the other, counteract the possible machinations of powers rivaling us" (quoted from). ). Pointing out that between Russia and Japan “there is no fundamental opposition,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proceeded from the fact that Japanese ports could serve as a refuge (!) for Russian naval forces in the Far East and supply them with “everything necessary.”

The reports of the tsarist diplomats show that they had little understanding of the main trends of Japanese foreign policy and the internal life of Japan. Russian representatives in Japan, with few exceptions, and after them the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs treated the aggressive speeches of Japanese politicians and the press with ironic disdain and did not understand the looming threat from Japan. Fast economic development Japan, the accelerated pace of build-up of the army and navy did not cause alarm in St. Petersburg. The instructions only noted the distrust and suspicion of Japanese influential circles towards Russia, who believed that Russia was hatching plans to seize Korea.

As the text of the instructions shows, Russia did not show any hostility towards Japan. As before, the instructions prescribed to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Japan, where at that time there was a fierce struggle between liberal and radical opposition circles of the ruling classes, as well as democratic forces (part of the petty bourgeoisie of the city and countryside, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia) ( In the 80s and early 90s, bourgeois and landowner parties were created: in 1881, the liberal-landowner Jiyuto party and in 1882, the liberal-bourgeois Kaishinto party. The radical phraseology of the liberal-landowner opposition sometimes made it a center of attraction for opposition-minded elements from other segments of the population. The liberal-bourgeois party was less radical in its opposition to the absolutist government due to the close connection of its leaders with the government bureaucracy. Participation of Japanese democratic circles in the fight against ruling elite gave it a militant character despite the restraining influence of the bourgeois-landowner parties on it.) against the reactionary dictatorship of the military-feudal elite. In the Japanese Diet, despite the fact that it was created on a very narrow social base, in the first years of its existence (after the adoption of the constitution of 1889) there were frequent conflicts (mainly disputes between parliament and the government). The parliamentary bourgeois-landowner opposition sharply criticized the methods and omnipotence of the government semi-feudal bureaucracy and demagogically expressed dissatisfaction with the colossal military expenditures. The instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that the Russian representative "carefully refrain from anything that could be interpreted in the direction of ... influence on our part." M.A. Khitrovo was instructed to achieve the opening of the port of Otarunai for foreign trade on the island of Hokkaido. But that wasn't the main thing. “Japan is important for us,” the instructions said, “not so much in trade, but in political terms, as one of the factors in the balance established in the Far East” (quoted from). Russian diplomats were tasked with strengthening the status quo in the Far East and, in particular, trying to prevent a Japanese-Chinese rapprochement on an anti-Russian basis.

The above documentary data and other numerous evidence refute the assertion of English, American and Japanese bourgeois authors about the hostile nature of Russia's policy towards Japan on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Meanwhile, England, hoping to use Japan's aggressive policy against Russia and China, finally agreed in 1894 to revise the unequal treaties. She signed an agreement to abolish consular jurisdiction in 1899. The Japanese-British agreement opened up the possibility of concluding a Russian-Japanese treaty on the basis of the 1889 agreement.

The Russian-Japanese Treaty on Trade and Navigation was signed on May 27, 1895 in St. Petersburg, immediately after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. The 1895 treaty replaced the treaties of 1855, 1858 and 1867. and all additional agreements to them, “as a result of which the jurisdiction still exercised by Russian courts in Japan, and all special privileges: exemptions and benefits that Russian subjects enjoyed ... are terminated and canceled completely without special notice” (Article 18) . Foreign settlements in Japan were to be incorporated into Japanese cities (Article 17).

Between both parties, “mutual freedom of trade and navigation” was established, as well as the principle of most favored nation in relation to duties and “everything pertaining to trade and navigation” (vv. 2-7). These rules did not apply to coastal navigation.

The subjects of each of the contracting parties in the territory of the other party enjoyed broad rights: freedom of travel and settlement, equal judicial and property rights with local residents, freedom of conscience and religious rites, etc. The parties granted each other the right to appoint their consuls everywhere (see).

Soviet- Japanese relations 1927-1941

Performed:

IV year student, group 42

Podgornova Ekaterina Igorevna

Scientific adviser:

Ph.D. Buranok S.O.

Samara, 2011

Plan

1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………3

2. Chapter 1. Soviet-Japanese relations: 20 - 30s………………...4

3. Chapter 2. Armed conflict in the area of ​​Lake Khasan………………11

4. Chapter 3. Soviet-Japanese relations on the eve of World War II…………………………………………………………………………………18

5. Conclusion……………...………………………………………………………………...22

6. Used literature………………..……………………………24

Introduction

Relevance and scientific significance of the topic. The problem of Japanese-Soviet rivalry in 1927-1941. is one of the least studied in historical science. This fact cannot be explained by the lack of interest on the part of domestic and foreign researchers in the Japanese-Soviet relations of this period. It was during these years that the foundations of the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union were laid, and mutual contradictions were revived and intensified.

In the Japanese-Soviet rivalry, as in any rivalry of this kind, along with opposition, confrontation and hostility, elements of mutual pragmatism, cooperation and even partnership appeared. In the context of a rapidly changing world, the absence of any clear stability in the external environment, the decline in prestige and the weakening of the military-political power and socio-economic potential of democratic Russia, it would not be out of place to recall the common interests that once not only separated, but also united these countries, about the experience, albeit short-lived, but so fruitful and fateful for both countries, of the partnership at the turn of the 30s and early 40s.

Made available in Lately documents and other sources allow us to raise the question of the existence of relations of rivalry between Japan and the Soviet Union in the Far East and, especially, in China. A more in-depth study is now required not only of the confrontational component of Japanese-Soviet relations, as was previously accepted, but also the study of numerous facts and evidence of the compromise, even with elements of partnership, policy of the two Pacific powers in relation to each other, without which rivalry of this kind is unthinkable.

The purpose of this essay is a comprehensive study of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union during this period.

Chapter 1. Soviet-Japanese relations: 20-30s.

In April 1927, the famous militarist General Giichi Tanaka formed a new cabinet. Tanaka's rise to power meant that the most reactionary elements gained the upper hand in Japan's ruling circles. Tanaka's lengthy memorandum, presented to the emperor in July 1927, is known; it outlined the aggressive foreign policy program of Japanese militarism.

IN difficult conditions at that time, the Soviet embassy and the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Japan, Alexei Antonovich Troyanovsky, had to work in Japan (from November 16, 1927 to 1933). The Soviet government set a clear task for its diplomats: to create a healthier atmosphere in relations with Japan and to actively fight against attempts by the military to start a war against the USSR. And reactionary Japanese newspapers wrote about the “devilish hand of Red Russia”, which was interfering in the internal affairs of the country. They called for monitoring the actions of the Russian embassy of the “palace of the hidden devil of the Bolshevization of Japan.”

Malice was also built up around Troyanovsky’s personality. The Zarya newspaper wrote with provocative intent: “We must congratulate Japan, which received as a gift from its neighbor a rare Soviet Russia specialist in the destruction of Asia - Troyanovsky." Not only the reactionary press, but also individual politicians They did not stop trying to persuade “communism” and the “Red danger” in every possible way; they called Troyanovsky a “dangerous person”. Soviet diplomats used every opportunity to bring to the attention and consciousness of broad sections of the Japanese people the basic principles of the USSR's foreign policy.

To the Soviet plenipotentiary’s proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact in March 1928 (and such proposals were made by the Soviet government in both 1926 and 1927), Tanaka had only one answer: “The time has not yet come for this. Events must develop gradually. Let's not rush. If you climb too high right away, you might fall.” G.V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, called Japan the country of the most subtle diplomacy in the world. And for many years this diplomacy was aimed at implementing - in successive stages - broad expansion in the Pacific basin. The Japanese military began developing plans for a military attack on the USSR in 1928. These plans in a significant way differed from normal operational

plans, the preparation of which was the function of the General Staff. Plans for the war against the USSR “code name - Otsu” were never of a conventional, theoretical nature; they were always distinguished by their specificity and thoroughness of development. The global economic crisis has led to a serious aggravation of the international situation. In Japan, production declined, unemployment grew, and the situation of workers worsened. The Japanese ruling circles sought a way out of the crisis through expansion. On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops attacked China and began the occupation of its northeastern provinces. The materials of the Tokyo Trial irrefutably proved: “both the occupation of Manchuria and the invasion of China proceeded from the ultimate strategic goal of Japan - the war against the USSR.” The Japanese military began developing a plan for a military attack on the USSR in 1928. These plans differed significantly from ordinary operational plans, the preparation of which was the function of the General Staff. Plans for the war against the USSR, codenamed “To the Father,” were never of a conventional, theoretical nature; they were always distinguished by their specificity and thoroughness of development. Thanks to these plans, the Japanese intended to seize: Primorye, Amur Region, Transbaikalia, Kamchatka, Northern Sakhalin and other territories of the Far East.

The “anti-Soviet pandemonium” in Japan, as Plenipotentiary Troyanovsky said, has reached its climax. The White Guards who settled on the Japanese Islands also began to stir. The White Guard General Semenov came to Tokyo. Aggressive imperialist circles called on the government to abandon its hesitations and attack the USSR without delaying matters. War Minister Araki argued that sooner or later a war between Japan and the USSR was inevitable, and that the country must be prepared for this war.

Araki, a convinced fascist, was one of the most active participants in the occupation of the Soviet Far East. He called the activities of the Soviet ambassador “intrigues” and told his associates that he did not believe in the frankness of the Russians when they put on a jacket and a top hat. Troyanovsky managed to meet with Araki in October 1932. With his visit, Troyanovsky caused confusion in the circles of the Japanese military, forcing them to change offensive tactics and maneuver. The influence of realistically thinking Japanese politicians, who considered the war against the USSR to be a trap for Japan, into which interested Western powers wanted to drag it, grew stronger. While sharply condemning Japanese aggression against China, the Soviet government at the same time sought to prevent the militaristic reactionary forces in Tokyo from aggravating relations between the USSR and Japan. It took a series of flexible diplomatic steps aimed at preventing a new anti-Soviet intervention. Trying to prevent and stop the further development of Japanese aggression, Soviet diplomacy tried to convince the government of Chiang Kai-shek of the need to unite the efforts of both states.

On December 31, 1931, taking advantage of the passage through Moscow of Yoshizawa, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the NKID proposed concluding a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. It was stated that the USSR had concluded non-aggression and neutrality pacts with Germany, Turkey, and Afghanistan, initialed a pact with France, and that negotiations were underway with Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Romania. “We will be bound by pacts with all our neighbors. Japan is the only neighbor of the USSR that has not concluded a non-aggression pact with it and is not negotiating such a pact. This situation is abnormal. Pact negotiations long time was conducted by Plenipotentiary Troyanovsky. Representatives of the Japanese government did their best to delay them, talking about the desirability of concluding an “alliance” between Japan, the USSR and Germany, or an alliance between Japan, the USSR and the puppet state of Manchukuo.”

The Japanese government responded to Soviet proposals only a year later. On December 13, 1932, it rejected the proposal to conclude a pact under the pretext that Japan and the USSR were parties to the multilateral Briand-Kellogg Pact, and this made the conclusion of a special non-aggression pact unnecessary. Another pretext given was that “the moment is not yet ripe for concluding a non-aggression pact.” It is very significant that the non-aggression pact was rejected by the Japanese government the day after the publication of a message about the restoration of relations between the USSR and China. Japanese diplomacy viewed this turn of events as a major defeat. Subsequently, the Soviet government again raised this issue. However, Japan, having irrevocably embarked on the path of aggression, constantly bearing in mind a future war against the Soviet Union, rejected peace proposals. USSR diplomacy was forced to pursue a cautious policy. Considering the ongoing provocations of the Japanese military on the Chinese Eastern Railway and wanting to deprive the Japanese imperialists of any reason to provoke a war, the Soviet government in June 1933 offered Japan to purchase this road. On June 26, negotiations began on this issue, which, however, dragged on for almost two years. They took place in a very difficult situation, with long breaks; the Manchu delegation, which was actually led by the Japanese, offered a clearly frivolous price - 50 million yen (20 million gold rubles).

The conference reached a dead end and ceased its meetings. Refusing to take any constructive position in the negotiations, the authorities of Japan and Manchukuo intensified the outrages on the Chinese Eastern Railway, damage to tracks, raids, etc. In the report of the USSR Embassy in Tokyo, Japanese policy was characterized as follows: “1933 was one of the most tense years in Soviet-Japanese relations. These relations reached particular tension in the fall, when the Japanese made an attempt to actually take control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and when the propaganda of war with the USSR on the part of the Japanese military reached its highest level.”

The Soviet government was forced to make great concessions, selling the road at a price much lower than its actual value in order to maintain peace in the Far East. On March 23, 1935, an agreement was signed on the acquisition of the road by the authorities of Manchukuo for 140 million yen. This was significantly less than the funds that were once invested by the Russian government in the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

After the military coup in Japan in February 1936, relations between Japan and the USSR continued to remain tense. Characterizing these relations, People's Commissar for foreign affairs The USSR, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu in December 1936, noted that there was no such concern on any border of the USSR as on the Soviet-Manchurian one. Particularly noteworthy, the People's Commissar emphasized, were the raids on Soviet territories, and Japan's stubborn refusal to conclude a non-aggression pact.

If we add to this the agitation and propaganda in the Japanese press and books in favor of Japan’s expansion at the expense of the USSR, “then it is not surprising that we were forced, against our will, at great material cost, to concentrate large military forces in the Far East for the purpose of self-defense.” When planning a war against the Soviet state, the Japanese militarists were aware that Japan alone would hardly be able to defeat it. And so they sought to find an ally, which completely coincided with the plans of the Nazis. Despite serious warnings Soviet government On November 25, 1936, Japan signed the so-called “Anti-Comintern Pact” with Germany. In a secret agreement that became known only in 1946 at the Tokyo Trial. The Soviet Union was named as the main "target" of the pact. A direct result of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact was a sharp deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations. Not a single month passed without two or three, and sometimes 8-9, reports appearing in our newspapers about violations of normal relations by the Japanese side and forced statements and protests on the part of the Soviet government. In November 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. Thus, the political unity of the three aggressors was achieved.

Preparations for a “great war” against the USSR intensified in Japanese government and military circles. The main elements in it were the acceleration of the creation of a military and military-industrial bridgehead in Manchuria and Korea, the expansion of aggression in China and the seizure of the most developed regions of Northern, Central and Southern China. The program was approved by the government of General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937. At the very first meeting of the government, General Hayashi stated that “the policy of liberalism towards the communists will be ended.” This meant that Japan had chosen the path decisive action in accordance with the terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Openly anti-Soviet articles began to appear in the Japanese press with

calls “to march to the Urals.”

Hayashi's cabinet was soon forced to resign, giving way to a new government led by Prince F. Konoe, whose political platform was openly anti-Russian. The Soviet government took vigorous measures to maintain peace on the Far Eastern borders. On April 4, 1938, the USSR invited Japan to peacefully resolve all controversial issues. The proposal did not meet with a positive response from Japan.

In May-June 1938, Japanese militaristic circles launched a broad propaganda campaign around the so-called “disputed territories” on the border of Manchukuo and Primorye.

Thus, during the period under review, the ruling circles of Japan stood on a platform of militant anti-Sovietism and unbridled aggression, which could not but lead to a worsening of relations between our countries.

"Golden Age" of Russian-Japanese relations

Chapter II. Russo-Japanese relations (1905-1916)

2.1 Post-war peace treaties and their role in the settlement of relations

The Portsmouth Treaty left a number of issues unresolved, outlining only a very general framework for future decisions. It was necessary to conclude a new trade treaty, a fishing convention, an agreement on connecting Russian and Japanese roads in Manchuria, as well as pay for the maintenance of prisoners of war. In an effort to restore normal and, if possible, trusting relations with Japan, Russia had to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. At the same time, Russian diplomacy naturally sought to do this with the least damage to the dignity and vital interests of the country in the Far East.

Japan, which needed a respite to consolidate its position in the captured positions, in turn, wanted to streamline relations with Russia. At the same time, Japanese diplomacy strove to use the balance of forces favorable to Tokyo to “tweak” the Portsmouth Treaty in its favor.

Negotiations began in the spring and summer of 1906, that is, after the exchange of envoys and the completion of the first stage of the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria. Both sides made careful preparations for them. Thus, in Russia, negotiations on the conclusion of a trade treaty were preceded by special interdepartmental meetings chaired by the ministers of foreign affairs and trade and industry. A number of commissions and meetings with the participation of fishery entrepreneurs have prepared ideas for a new fishing convention. Treaties on trade and navigation were also signed.

The first of them consisted of the treaty itself, “separate articles,” a protocol regulating the procedure for trade with Liaodong territory, and additional notes specifying that “separate articles” did not put the counterparty in a worse position than other powers. Japan promised that it would take advantage of the negotiated advantages in relation to Korea and the countries East Asia only after 1911. It was planned to open Japanese consulates in Vladivostok and Nikolaev, and Russian consulates in the Japanese ports of Tsuruga and Otaru.

If economic importance The new treaty was not large due to the small turnover of Russian-Japanese trade, then its political importance seemed undoubted. The special position of Russia and Japan in relation to certain countries, regulated by “separate articles”2, served as a kind of delimitation of the spheres of their economic influence and in this part complemented the political convention. In a later (1908) instruction to the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, the importance of mutual concessions was emphasized, “by which Russia is placed in a privileged position with the neighboring Asian countries, and Japan with Korea and with the countries in the East of the Strait of Malacca.” “Thanks to these mutual concessions,” it said, “Russia has retained the right to enter into certain separate agreements with China, and Japan has a free hand in Korea and in its neighboring tropical latitudes, where Russian interests do not develop.”

The fishing convention included basic conditions and a protocol that formulated restrictions on Japanese rights in certain areas, with a detailed cartographic appendix. According to the convention, Japanese people were given the right to catch fish, algae and marine mammals, with the exception of sea beavers and fur seals. Fishing and processing of sea products could be carried out in fishing areas specially designated for this purpose, leased out at auction. The Japanese, who leased fishing areas, received the right to use the coastal space within these areas for processing and storing fishing products, repairing ships, gear, etc. Russian fish farmers in the Far East, in turn, received the right to duty-free export of fish to Japan Validity period The convention was set at 12 years.

Russian diplomacy managed to exclude from the scope of the agreement the mouths of rivers, places of settlement of native tribes or Russian settlers, as well as 34 bays. Japan received the right, with some restrictions, to engage in fishing in the Amur Estuary, and at the last stage of negotiations, these restrictions were somewhat weakened.

This trade agreement and the fishing convention have received positive reviews. The leadership of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry did not deny the seriousness of the economic concessions made, but emphasized the political significance of both agreements in terms of eliminating obligations under the Portsmouth Peace, stabilizing the situation in the Far East and creating conditions for new agreements between the two empires. The leaders of the diplomatic department also believed that they managed to defend the most important economic positions - not to allow Japan to carry out a peaceful economic takeover of the Russian Far East, to protect the interests of Russian colonization of the region, its native population and to preserve opportunities for the development of the Russian fishing industry.

The assessments of the Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not alien to self-promotion. The Russian press and some figures of that time who did not belong to government circles approached the Russian-Japanese settlement more critically. Witte, for example, believed that the trade treaty and the fishing convention “gave Japan greater rights and benefits than were directly implied by the treaty.

The newspapers almost unanimously welcomed the July 17 convention and the political aspect of the agreements on trade, fisheries and railway issues.

Foreign responses also allow us to objectively weigh the significance of the Russian-Japanese agreements. In Japanese government circles, these agreements were considered a great diplomatic success. The press unanimously welcomed the new phase of relations with Russia. Massive celebrations were organized throughout the country.

In France and England, the Russian-Japanese settlement was welcomed as a factor that would put an end to the Far Eastern “fascination” of tsarism, bring Russia closer to the Anglo-French-Japanese group and facilitate an Anglo-Russian agreement. Newspapers tried to downplay the significance of the concessions made by the Russian side and to present even the terms of the fishing convention as quite beneficial to Russia.

For obvious reasons, Germany's reaction turned out to be the opposite. Even during the Russian-Japanese negotiations, on June 2, 1907, V Sheen handed Izvolsky a memorandum in which he indicated that his side was ready to treat with understanding Russia’s resolution of its controversial issues with Japan and England, but would protest against any actions aimed to participate in its anti-German alliance with Japan, England and France. In response, Izvolsky assured the ambassador that we were only talking about agreements on specific issues within a limited area.

Notifying other countries about the signing of a political convention with Japan, Izvolsky tried to emphasize its peaceful goals and regional character. He failed, however, to calm Berlin down. The German envoy in Beijing, Rex, argued that the agreements between France and Russia with Japan, concluded with the knowledge and consent of England, ultimately changed the political situation in the Far East as unexpected and unfavorable for Germany, emphasizing the unfavorable conditions of the settlement for Russia and the success of Japan.

Historians rightly believe that during the 1907 settlement, Japan was able to use an advantageous situation to develop some important provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty in its favor. The terms of the fishing convention and some articles of the treatise on trade and navigation created Japanese capital favorable conditions for expansion in the Russian Far East. This demonstrated the inability of tsarism, which feared new internal complications in the event of a conflict with Japan, to firmly defend the country’s national interests. At the same time, Russian-Japanese agreements led to the settlement of a number of controversial issues and to the rapprochement of the two states in the fight against competitors in China, primarily the United States. The settlement in the Far East allowed tsarism to shift its attention to other regions, contributed to the Anglo-Russian agreement and, in the future, Russia’s entry into the Entente.

The treaties of July 1907 served as an impetus for the further development of Russian-Japanese relations. In September 1907, the Parties agreed to upgrade the rank of mutual representations to embassies, which was tantamount to official recognition of Japan as a great power by Tsarist Russia. In October-November, Tokyo's financial claims were satisfied.

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